Pakistan’s militancy problem has moved through several distinct phases rather than following a single continuous trajectory. The country experienced a major wave of insurgent and terrorist violence in the 2000s and early 2010s, followed by a substantial decline after 2014–15 as military operations and counterterrorism measures disrupted militant networks. That decline was not permanent. Violence began rising again in 2021 and accelerated sharply thereafter, with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan emerging as the principal theatres.
The character of the threat has changed along with its intensity. Earlier violence involved large-scale attacks on civilians, sectarian massacres, suicide bombings and attempts by the Pakistani Taliban to establish territorial influence. The current phase is more heavily concentrated on security forces and state institutions, while militant organizations have adapted through ambushes, raids, targeted killings, suicide attacks and coordinated assaults. The TTP is central to the resurgence in KP, while Baloch separatist organizations and Islamic State-Khorasan represent important but different strands of Pakistan’s current militant landscape.
From insurgency to a nationwide militant campaign
Pakistan’s contemporary militancy crisis developed out of several overlapping conflicts.
The rise of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the mid-2000s brought together numerous militant factions operating primarily in the country’s northwest. The organization opposed the Pakistani state and sought to impose its interpretation of Islamic rule.
At the same time, Pakistan faced longstanding sectarian organizations, including groups responsible for attacks against Shia communities, as well as separatist insurgencies in Balochistan.
This produced a security environment in which the word militancy covered several different phenomena:
- Islamist insurgency against the Pakistani state
- sectarian terrorism
- separatist insurgency
- attacks against military and police personnel
- suicide bombings and mass-casualty attacks
- militant-criminal networks
The distinction remains important today. A TTP attack and a Baloch separatist attack may both be counted as militant violence, but they arise from different political and organizational conflicts.
The 2007–2014 period: militants challenge the state
The late 2000s were characterized by an unusually broad militant campaign.
Militants attacked military installations, police stations, government facilities, markets, mosques, hotels, public gatherings and other civilian targets. Suicide bombings became a particularly destructive tactic.
The threat was also increasingly territorial.
In parts of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Swat, militant organizations were able to establish significant influence and, for periods, openly challenge the authority of the Pakistani state.
The conflict consequently required more than conventional policing. Pakistan increasingly relied on military operations alongside intelligence-led counterterrorism measures.
The scale of the violence can be seen in CRSS data. Its 2013–2018 series records 4,629 fatalities from terror attacks in 2013, compared with 3,850 in 2014 and 1,718 in 2015. By 2018, the corresponding figure had fallen to 739.
These figures include different categories of violence than some contemporary terrorism datasets, so they should not be treated as a universal terrorism count. Their value is in showing the magnitude and direction of the change.
2014–2020: the major decline
The turning point came in 2014.
Following a series of major attacks and the breakdown of attempts to contain militant organizations, Pakistan launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan in June 2014. The December 2014 Army Public School attack in Peshawar further accelerated the country’s counterterrorism response.
Pakistan subsequently adopted the 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) in December 2014. NACTA says the plan was developed after the Army Public School attack and approved by Parliament on December 24, 2014. It included measures aimed at militant organizations, terrorist financing, extremist propaganda, sectarianism and the strengthening of counterterrorism institutions.
The security picture changed dramatically.
CRSS recorded 7,611 violence-related deaths in 2014, falling to 4,653 in 2015. Fatalities from direct militant attacks fell from 982 to 445, while terrorism-related fatalities in its classification declined from 516 to 246.
The decline continued through the second half of the decade. CRSS reported that violence-related fatalities fell for six consecutive years from 2015 through 2020. In 2020, it recorded 600 fatalities from terrorism and counterterror-related incidents.
This period fundamentally changed Pakistan’s security environment.
Militant groups lost much of their ability to openly hold territory or conduct attacks at the frequency seen earlier in the conflict.
But declining attacks did not mean that militancy had disappeared.
Networks survived, militants relocated, and some organizations adapted their operations. CRSS noted in 2015 that militants displaced from Pakistan’s border areas were conducting cross-border attacks from Afghanistan while dormant networks remained capable of operating elsewhere.
That distinction became important several years later.
The 2021 turning point
The downward trend ended in 2021.
CRSS recorded an approximately 42% increase in violence-related fatalities in 2021, from 600 to 853. Nearly three-quarters of those fatalities occurred in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including the former FATA, and Balochistan.
The timing coincided with a major regional change: the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021.
It would be too simple to describe the subsequent Pakistani resurgence as having one cause. CRSS itself cautions against attributing the TTP’s resurgence solely to events in Afghanistan, pointing instead to several underlying factors, including the TTP’s organizational consolidation and disputes with the Pakistani state.
Nevertheless, the Afghan transition changed the strategic environment.
The TTP had historically maintained networks on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. After the Taliban takeover, Pakistan became increasingly concerned about militants operating from Afghan territory. Islamabad has repeatedly accused Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities of allowing TTP members to operate from Afghan soil; Kabul has rejected those accusations.
The resulting dispute has become an important part of Pakistan’s current security crisis.
2022: the resurgence becomes unmistakable
The increase continued in 2022.
CRSS recorded 980 fatalities from terrorist attacks and counterterrorism operations, compared with 850 in 2021. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa experienced the sharpest increase, with fatalities rising from 399 to 633—almost 59%.
The geography was revealing.
The Greater Bannu region emerged as a major concentration of militant activity, alongside areas adjoining Waziristan, Bajaur and Kurram. Security forces were increasingly the principal targets in KP and Balochistan.
This represented a significant change from the mass-casualty civilian terrorism that had defined much of the previous decade.
The civilian population remained at risk, but militants were increasingly devoting resources to attacking the institutions responsible for maintaining state authority.
The changing target: from crowds to the state
One of the clearest changes in Pakistan’s militancy problem is who militants are trying to kill.
During the peak years of the insurgency, markets, mosques, schools, shrines, hotels and other civilian locations were frequent targets.
The current conflict still includes attacks against civilians, but security forces have become a particularly important target.
CRSS reported that in 2024 Pakistan’s security forces experienced 444 terror attacks and 685 fatalities, the highest levels in its decade-long series.
The TTP has increasingly emphasized attacks against police and military personnel. CRSS describes this as part of a broader change in TTP strategy, including surprise attacks by larger groups of militants and the use of coordinated assaults.
This does not make the present threat less dangerous to civilians. In fact, attacks on security installations can produce substantial civilian casualties, particularly when military or police facilities are located within populated areas.
The difference is that the state itself has become more consistently central to the target selection.
Militants have also changed how they attack
The methods have evolved alongside the targets.
Earlier militant campaigns frequently relied on suicide bombings, roadside explosives, assassinations and attacks by relatively small armed groups.
More recent attacks have included larger assault teams, raids on security compounds, ambushes, coordinated attacks from multiple directions and suicide vehicles.
CRSS describes the TTP’s post-2021 approach as including attacks involving groups of 10 or more militants and combinations of firearms, grenades and vehicle-borne explosives.
The distinction matters because a militant group does not need to control territory to impose significant security costs.
A relatively small organization can create persistent pressure by repeatedly attacking checkpoints, police stations, patrols and other vulnerable points.
The geography has narrowed—and then shifted
Pakistan’s current militant violence is highly concentrated geographically.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan have become the principal theatres, while Punjab, Sindh and Islamabad have experienced substantially fewer incidents in comparison.
In 2025, CRSS reported that KP and Balochistan together accounted for more than 96% of all violence-related fatalities during the first 11 months of the year. KP alone accounted for nearly 68%.
Within KP, the geography has also evolved.
The former tribal districts remain important, particularly North and South Waziristan and Bajaur. But southern settled districts—including Bannu, Lakki Marwat and Dera Ismail Khan—have become increasingly prominent.
CRSS identified Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Kurram and Bajaur as accounting for 63% of KP’s violence incidents in the second quarter of 2026.
This is one of the most consequential changes from the earlier period.
The problem can no longer be described simply as militancy confined to the former tribal belt.
Balochistan represents a different conflict
Pakistan’s resurgence in violence is not exclusively an Islamist insurgency.
Balochistan has experienced a parallel escalation involving Baloch separatist organizations, particularly the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF).
Their objectives differ from those of the TTP.
The TTP is an Islamist militant organization seeking changes to Pakistan’s political and religious order, while Baloch separatist organizations are primarily engaged in an ethno-nationalist conflict over Balochistan’s political status, resources and relationship with the Pakistani state.
Yet their effects overlap in national security statistics.
CRSS reported that Balochistan accounted for more than 28% of Pakistan’s violence-related fatalities during the first 11 months of 2025, compared with nearly 68% for KP.
That means Pakistan’s contemporary militancy problem is better understood as multiple insurgencies and extremist threats occurring simultaneously, rather than one nationwide organization driving all violence.
Sectarian terrorism has not disappeared
Another important change is easy to miss when attention focuses on the TTP.
Sectarian violence declined substantially during the period when overall terrorism fell, but it has not vanished.
CRSS recorded 182 sectarian-violence deaths in 2024, including victims from Shia and Sunni communities. It also found that the cumulative number of Shia and Sunni deaths from sectarian violence during 2021–2024 was slightly higher than the total recorded during 2015–2020.
The result is a more complicated security environment.
Pakistan simultaneously faces:
- anti-state Islamist militancy
- sectarian terrorism
- separatist insurgency
- attacks on security forces
- transnational jihadist organizations
- localized militant and criminal networks
These categories can overlap, but they should not be treated as interchangeable.
The return of Islamic State-Khorasan
The emergence of Islamic State-Khorasan (ISKP) adds another dimension.
ISKP has operated in Afghanistan and Pakistan and has conducted attacks against civilians and religious minorities, including the March 2022 bombing of a Shia mosque in Peshawar.
Its presence matters because it represents a different ideological and organizational threat from the TTP.
The two groups have also been rivals in the broader militant environment. Consequently, the presence of multiple jihadist organizations does not necessarily mean that they are coordinating their campaigns.
For security planners, this creates an additional problem: reducing one organization’s operational capability does not automatically remove other extremist networks.
2023–2025: the conflict becomes more sustained
The increase after 2021 was not a temporary spike.
CRSS recorded successive increases in overall violence of roughly 38% in 2021, 15% in 2022, 56% in 2023 and nearly 67% in 2024. In its annual assessment, it described 2025 as the most violent year in a decade, with 3,417 violence-linked fatalities.
The methodology is important here: these are violence-linked fatalities, encompassing terrorist attacks, insurgent violence and counterterrorism operations rather than simply civilians killed by terrorism.
That distinction becomes especially important in 2025.
During the first three quarters, CRSS recorded 2,414 violence-related fatalities, of which 1,265 resulted from security operations. Terror attacks accounted for 1,022 deaths during the same period.
In other words, the modern conflict is increasingly a cycle of militant attacks and intensive state operations, rather than a simple count of terrorist attacks against civilians.
The state response has changed too
Pakistan’s response has evolved considerably since the peak insurgency years.
The earlier period was dominated by large military campaigns intended to clear militant strongholds.
The later period has placed greater emphasis on intelligence-led operations, targeted raids, police counterterrorism capabilities and attacks against militant networks.
The numbers indicate how intense this response has become.
In the first three quarters of 2025, CRSS recorded 1,265 deaths from security operations, more than half of all violence-linked fatalities in its dataset for that period.
That does not, by itself, establish that counterterrorism operations are succeeding or failing. The figure measures the intensity and lethality of the conflict, not the effectiveness of the underlying strategy.
It does show that Pakistan’s security forces are now operating in an environment in which militant attacks and state counteroperations are both occurring at high levels.
A useful way to see the transformation
| Period | Dominant pattern | Main geographic focus | Important targets | Defining development |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2007–2013 | Broad insurgency and terrorism | FATA, KP, Balochistan, major cities | Civilians, government, military, religious sites | TTP expansion and widespread suicide terrorism |
| 2014–2015 | Major military counteroffensive | North Waziristan and other militant strongholds | Militants and state targets | Zarb-e-Azb and National Action Plan |
| 2016–2020 | Lower-intensity militancy | Former FATA, KP, Balochistan | Security forces and selected civilian targets | Sustained decline in nationwide violence |
| 2021–2022 | Renewed insurgency | KP and Balochistan | Increasingly police and military | TTP resurgence following Afghanistan’s Taliban takeover |
| 2023–2024 | Intensifying militant campaign | KP frontier and southern districts; Balochistan | Security forces, state facilities and civilians | Higher attack frequency and more complex assaults |
| 2025–2026 | Sustained, geographically concentrated conflict | KP and Balochistan | Security forces, government facilities and selected civilian/religious targets | Expanded militant operations alongside intensive counterterrorism activity |
The figures behind these periods come primarily from CRSS’s longitudinal security reporting; definitions differ between datasets, so the table is intended to show the evolution of the conflict rather than provide a single standardized annual terrorism series.
Why the old “war on terror” model no longer fully describes the problem
The phrase war on terror can obscure how different today’s environment is from the one Pakistan faced fifteen years ago.
The earlier challenge included militants capable of controlling territory and mounting frequent spectacular attacks across the country.
The present challenge is more fragmented and geographically concentrated.
The TTP remains a major threat in KP, Baloch separatists drive much of the violence in Balochistan, and ISKP represents a separate transnational jihadist threat. At the same time, sectarian organizations and smaller militant factions remain capable of conducting attacks.
This fragmentation makes the problem harder to reduce to one military campaign.
There is also less separation between “frontier” and “settled” areas. Southern KP districts have become important militant theatres, while attacks on police compounds and other state facilities can occur inside major population centres.
The September 2026 attack on a mosque inside the Kohat Police Lines illustrates this convergence: a religious gathering was located within a security installation, allowing attackers to target both worshippers and state personnel in one operation.
What has remained constant
Despite these changes, several features of Pakistan’s militant problem have endured.
The country’s western geography remains crucial. KP’s border with Afghanistan continues to shape militant movement and organizational networks.
Security forces remain major targets.
Religious and civilian gatherings remain vulnerable to mass-casualty attacks.
And militant organizations continue to adapt when conventional counterterrorism measures disrupt their previous methods.
The experience of 2015–2020 demonstrates that substantial reductions in violence are possible. But the resurgence after 2021 also demonstrates that a reduction in attacks is not necessarily equivalent to the permanent elimination of militant capacity. CRSS’s long-term data show a pronounced decline followed by five consecutive years of rising overall violence from 2021 through 2025.
The unresolved question is whether the current cycle can be broken
Pakistan’s central security challenge is now different from the one it confronted at the height of the insurgency.
The question is no longer simply whether the state can clear a militant stronghold. Much of the current threat comes from organizations that can operate without holding territory, exploit cross-border networks, attack security personnel and repeatedly regenerate after losses.
The recent pattern also shows why geography, organization and tactics have to be considered together. KP’s frontier and southern districts form the main theatre of the TTP-led insurgency; Balochistan faces a parallel separatist conflict; and transnational jihadist organizations add another layer of risk.
What happens next will depend on factors that remain difficult to measure in advance: the durability of militant networks, conditions along the Afghanistan border, the capacity of Pakistani security institutions, the evolution of militant alliances and the ability of the state to prevent recurring attacks without allowing the conflict to become permanently self-sustaining.
That is the defining difference between Pakistan’s earlier and current militancy problems. The country has moved from a period of broad, nationwide insurgent violence, through a substantial security-driven decline, into a renewed but more geographically concentrated and organizationally fragmented conflict. The scale of the resurgence is now clear; its eventual trajectory remains an open question.