Brazil is using BRICS to pursue a larger role in a changing world economy—not by abandoning the United States, Europe or the existing multilateral system, but by giving emerging economies more institutions, financial options and influence over the rules of international commerce. The shift is becoming increasingly concrete: the expanded BRICS framework now spans major economies across Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East, while the New Development Bank is financing infrastructure and development projects across emerging markets.
For Brazil, the attraction of this emerging multipolar system is practical. More trading partners can reduce dependence on individual markets; alternative sources of development finance can broaden investment options; local-currency payment initiatives can create additional channels for cross-border commerce; and stronger Global South institutions can give countries such as Brazil greater influence in debates over trade, finance, technology and development. But BRICS is not a replacement for the WTO or the dollar-based financial system, and its members have different interests. Brazil’s strategy is therefore better understood as diversification and institutional reform than as a clean break with the existing order.
Why Brazil wants a more multipolar economy
Brazil has long pursued a foreign policy based on diversification.
Its economy is too large and its trade interests too broad to depend on one geopolitical relationship. China is a major destination for Brazilian commodities, the United States remains an important market and investment partner, Europe is a major commercial and regulatory center, and Brazil’s relationships with Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia provide additional opportunities.
That makes multipolarity economically useful.
A multipolar trading system gives Brazil more than diplomatic flexibility. It can provide alternative customers, investors, financing sources and supply chains when conditions change in one market.
The idea has become particularly relevant as governments increasingly use tariffs, industrial policy, export controls, sanctions, investment screening and strategic supply-chain policies.
For Brazil, the response is not necessarily to choose another dominant power.
It is to increase the number of relationships on which its economy can rely.
BRICS has become much larger than the original BRIC idea
The original BRIC grouping—Brazil, Russia, India and China—was created as a framework for cooperation among major emerging economies. South Africa joined in 2011, creating BRICS.
The group has since expanded substantially. Indonesia became a full member in January 2025, and the expanded grouping now has 11 members.
The geographic effect is significant.
BRICS now connects South America with major economies in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. That gives Brazil access to a diplomatic and economic network much broader than its immediate region.
But size alone does not make BRICS an integrated economic bloc.
The members have different currencies, economic structures, political systems, strategic interests and relationships with Western countries. BRICS is not equivalent to the European Union, nor is it a conventional free-trade agreement.
Its importance lies in coordination.
What Brazil wants BRICS to change
Brazil’s interest in BRICS can be understood through several connected objectives:
- greater representation for emerging economies in global institutions;
- more development financing for infrastructure and sustainable investment;
- easier cross-border payments;
- greater use of local currencies where commercially practical;
- stronger South-South cooperation;
- broader participation in international trade;
- reform of institutions such as the IMF and WTO;
- greater developing-country influence over emerging areas such as artificial intelligence and digital commerce.
These objectives do not require Brazil to reject existing institutions.
In fact, Brazil has continued to support the multilateral trading system and the WTO while advocating reforms to make it more representative and effective.
That distinction is central to understanding Brasília’s position.
Brazil is not trying to replace the WTO
It would be misleading to describe BRICS as an attempt to dismantle the existing global trading system.
Brazil has a major interest in predictable international trade rules because its exporters depend on access to foreign markets.
The Brazilian approach has therefore been to argue for reform of multilateral institutions while creating additional mechanisms through which emerging economies can cooperate.
That is a different proposition from economic separation.
Brazil can support WTO reform while participating in BRICS.
It can trade heavily with the United States while developing stronger commercial links with China and India.
It can deepen relations with China while negotiating with Europe.
It can work with BRICS financial institutions while continuing to use established international financial markets.
This flexibility is one of the defining features of Brazil’s approach.
The New Development Bank makes BRICS more than a diplomatic forum
The strongest evidence that BRICS has developed real economic infrastructure is the New Development Bank.
Created by the original BRICS countries, the NDB finances infrastructure and sustainable-development projects in emerging markets and developing countries. The bank says it had approved 139 projects totaling US$42.9 billion as of its published project statistics, with operations spanning areas including clean energy, transport, water, social infrastructure and digital infrastructure.
The bank’s role is particularly relevant to Brazil because infrastructure is one of the country’s persistent economic constraints.
Ports, airports, railways, waterways, electricity networks and digital infrastructure determine how cheaply Brazilian companies can participate in global trade.
That creates a direct connection between development finance and international commerce.
In August 2026, Brazil’s Ministry of Ports and Airports presented port, airport and waterway projects to NDB leadership in Shanghai as potential candidates for financing. The ministry said access to additional sources of financing could support greater investment by Brazilian and other BRICS-country companies.
This is what institutional diversification looks like in practice: not merely another summit declaration, but another potential source of capital for physical infrastructure.
The NDB is also becoming a broader Global South institution
The NDB’s importance is not limited to the five countries that created it.
The bank has expanded its membership and continues to consider further expansion. At the 2026 BRICS summit in New Delhi, BRICS leaders reiterated support for expanding NDB membership, while the bank highlighted its role in sustainable development across the Global South.
In September 2026, BRICS and the NDB also launched the BRICS-NDB Knowledge Portal, designed to share policy experience, technical knowledge and project practices among BRICS countries and other developing economies.
That may appear less significant than lending money, but institutional knowledge can have long-term value.
Countries do not need only capital to develop infrastructure. They need expertise in procurement, project preparation, financial structuring, environmental standards, digital systems and public-private partnerships.
The creation of shared institutional knowledge gives South-South cooperation another dimension.
The dollar question is more complicated than it sounds
One of the most discussed aspects of BRICS is the possibility of reducing dependence on the US dollar.
The subject is often framed as though BRICS is preparing to create a new currency that will replace the dollar.
That is a much stronger claim than the evidence supports.
The more practical direction has been toward improving cross-border payments, exploring greater use of local currencies and reducing unnecessary transaction costs.
Those measures can make trade more flexible without requiring the creation of a single BRICS currency.
The distinction matters because an international currency depends on much more than political agreement. Deep financial markets, liquidity, institutional credibility, convertibility and investor confidence all matter.
A Brazilian company trading with an Indian or Chinese partner may benefit from additional settlement mechanisms even if the US dollar remains an important part of the international financial system.
The likely significance is therefore diversification of payment channels rather than an immediate replacement of the existing monetary architecture.
Brazil’s real economic advantage is optionality
The most important benefit of a multipolar trading system for Brazil may be what could be called economic optionality.
Consider a Brazilian exporter with customers in only one major market.
If tariffs increase, demand falls or regulations change, the exporter has limited alternatives.
A company selling into several regions has more room to redirect production, negotiate with buyers and manage temporary disruptions.
That logic applies at the national level.
| Economic relationship | What it gives Brazil | Strategic limitation |
|---|---|---|
| China and Asia | Large demand for agriculture, minerals and energy | Commodity concentration and exposure to Asian demand |
| United States | Major consumer market, investment and industrial links | Policy and tariff uncertainty |
| European Union | Large diversified market and regulatory integration | High standards and compliance costs |
| Mercosur | Regional trade and industrial supply chains | Smaller combined market than major global blocs |
| BRICS | South-South coordination and institutional cooperation | Diverse members and limited economic integration |
| New Development Bank | Additional development-finance capacity | Cannot replace Brazil’s broader financing ecosystem |
| Africa and Middle East | New customers, investment and commercial partnerships | Fragmented markets and logistical challenges |
| India and wider Asia | Consumer growth and market diversification | Distance, competition and infrastructure costs |
The objective is not for every relationship to become equally important.
It is to ensure that no single relationship becomes indispensable.
Mercosur and Europe remain part of the same strategy
Brazil’s multipolar strategy should not be interpreted as a pivot away from Europe.
The Mercosur-European Union agreement signed in January 2026 created a major framework for deeper commercial integration. Brazil’s government describes it as establishing one of the world’s largest free-trade areas, covering a market of roughly 720 million people and a combined GDP above US$22 trillion.
That matters because Europe provides Brazil with something different from China’s enormous demand for commodities.
It offers a highly diversified consumer market, industrial customers, services opportunities and access to advanced technologies and investment.
European regulatory standards are demanding, particularly in areas such as sustainability, food safety and traceability. But meeting those standards can also encourage Brazilian producers to move toward higher-value and more sophisticated exports.
This is why multipolarity does not necessarily mean choosing between BRICS and Europe.
Brazil can pursue both.
Asia gives Brazil another layer of diversification
China is central to Brazil’s relationship with Asia, but the broader opportunity is much larger.
India, Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asia and other Asian markets provide different sources of demand and investment.
India is particularly significant because its large population, expanding economy and different commodity needs create opportunities that do not perfectly overlap with China’s.
That diversity matters.
If Brazil’s Asian strategy consisted only of China, it would still leave the country heavily concentrated.
If Brazil develops commercial relationships across several Asian economies, the region becomes a broader portfolio of markets.
The same principle applies to Africa and the Middle East.
Africa is part of Brazil’s South-South strategy
Brazil’s relationship with Africa has diplomatic roots going back decades, but the economic opportunity is increasingly important.
Brazil has relevant capabilities in agriculture, food production, tropical farming, energy, mining, machinery and infrastructure.
African economies also have long-term needs in food security, transport, electricity, urban infrastructure and agricultural productivity.
Yet the opportunity should not be romanticized.
Africa is not one market.
Regulations, currencies, logistics, purchasing power and political conditions vary considerably between countries. Brazilian companies therefore need specific commercial strategies rather than treating the continent as a single destination.
BRICS can create political connections, but companies still have to solve the practical problems of finding customers, financing transactions and delivering products competitively.
The Middle East adds capital as well as customers
The Middle East provides another complementary relationship.
Brazil is already a major food supplier to countries in the region. But the commercial relationship increasingly includes investment, infrastructure, energy and logistics.
This creates a two-way opportunity.
Brazil can export products to Gulf and other Middle Eastern markets while attracting capital into Brazilian infrastructure and productive sectors.
That distinction is important for long-term development.
Trade creates revenue.
Investment can create productive capacity.
When the two reinforce each other, diversification becomes more durable.
Brazil’s 2026 position shows how the strategy is evolving
The evolution of BRICS since Brazil’s 2025 presidency also shows that the organization is becoming more institutionalized.
India hosted the 18th BRICS Summit in September 2026, while the NDB participated alongside BRICS members and other emerging economies. The NDB says the summit emphasized resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability and highlighted the bank’s growing contribution to development in the Global South.
The bank’s work has continued independently as well. Its 2026 project portfolio includes financing for Brazilian electricity infrastructure, Indian energy and housing projects and South African water infrastructure.
These developments matter because institutions become influential through repeated use.
A summit declaration can establish a political objective.
A bank financing infrastructure can create a physical asset.
A payment mechanism used by companies can create a commercial habit.
A shared technical platform can build institutional capacity.
The second category is harder to achieve—but potentially more durable.
The biggest obstacle is not geopolitical disagreement
BRICS faces obvious political and strategic differences among its members.
But the more fundamental challenge is economic.
It is difficult to create meaningful integration among geographically distant economies with different regulations, currencies, infrastructure and industrial structures.
Brazil cannot make exports competitive simply by signing agreements.
A Brazilian manufacturer still needs efficient logistics.
A food exporter still needs to satisfy foreign sanitary rules.
A technology company still needs customers and skilled workers.
An infrastructure project still needs financing that makes economic sense.
A new payment mechanism still needs banks and companies willing to use it.
That is why Brazil’s domestic economic capacity will ultimately determine how much benefit it can extract from its international strategy.
The missing piece is higher-value trade
Brazil has enormous natural advantages.
It is a major agricultural producer, has substantial mineral resources, a large energy system and a diversified industrial base.
But the long-term challenge is to turn those advantages into more sophisticated exports.
Selling soybeans, iron ore, oil or meat to multiple countries is better diversified than selling them to one country.
But it still leaves Brazil exposed to commodity prices.
A stronger version of diversification would involve more processed food, machinery, industrial technology, chemicals, aircraft, digital services, clean-energy technology and other higher-value exports.
That is where infrastructure, research, education and industrial productivity become inseparable from foreign policy.
BRICS can provide markets and financing.
It cannot manufacture Brazilian competitiveness.
Why the new economic order will probably be gradual
The language surrounding the rise of a “new global economic order” can make the transformation sound sudden.
The underlying process is more gradual.
Existing institutions remain extremely important.
The dollar remains central to international finance.
The United States and European Union remain major economic powers.
China remains central to global manufacturing and trade.
The WTO remains a key reference point for international trade rules.
The IMF and World Bank remain important sources of financial and technical assistance.
At the same time, alternative institutions are becoming more significant.
The NDB has an established lending portfolio. BRICS has expanded its membership. Emerging economies are coordinating more closely on financial and trade issues. Countries are experimenting with alternative payment arrangements and local-currency settlement.
The result is not necessarily the disappearance of the old system.
It is a more crowded system.
What Brazil wants from that crowded system
Brazil’s strategy becomes clearer when reduced to a few practical objectives.
It wants access to more markets.
It wants more sources of investment and development finance.
It wants greater influence over international rules.
It wants emerging economies to have more representation in global institutions.
It wants greater freedom to conduct trade and financial transactions through multiple channels.
And it wants to avoid becoming excessively dependent on any single geopolitical relationship.
Those objectives are compatible with maintaining strong economic relationships with the United States, Europe and China.
That is why describing Brazil’s BRICS policy simply as “anti-Western” misses much of the economic logic.
Brazil’s approach is better described as diversification within an increasingly competitive international system.
What could determine whether the strategy succeeds
Several developments will be especially important to watch.
First, the NDB’s scale. Its current portfolio demonstrates that it is a functioning multilateral development bank, but its influence will depend on how much capital it can mobilize and how widely it can finance projects. The bank’s 2026 strategy discussions include continued membership expansion and preparation of its 2027–2031 general strategy.
Second, payment infrastructure. Additional cross-border payment channels could reduce costs and provide resilience, but their usefulness will depend on adoption by commercial banks and businesses.
Third, BRICS cohesion. The larger the group becomes, the more difficult consensus can be. Greater membership can increase global representation while also increasing the diversity of interests.
Fourth, Brazil’s export competitiveness. More markets are valuable only if Brazilian companies can compete in them.
Fifth, the future of existing institutions. If WTO and international financial reforms give emerging economies greater representation, Brazil’s strategy may increasingly operate through both established and newer institutions rather than between two completely separate systems.
The real shift is from dependence to choice
Brazil’s BRICS strategy is ultimately about expanding its choices.
The country does not need to abandon its existing trading partners to gain greater autonomy. It can trade with China while building stronger relationships with India. It can deepen commercial ties with Europe while participating in BRICS. It can maintain extensive economic links with the United States while developing new payment and financing options.
That is the practical meaning of multipolarity for Brazil.
The emerging global economic order is unlikely to be defined by one institution replacing another. It is more likely to consist of overlapping systems: traditional Western-led institutions, regional trade agreements, BRICS cooperation, development banks, new payment networks and increasingly diverse South-South commercial relationships.
Brazil’s influence will depend on how effectively it can operate across all of them.
The decisive question is therefore not whether BRICS will replace the existing economic order. It is whether Brazil can use BRICS, Mercosur, Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and established global institutions together to build enough economic options that its prosperity no longer depends disproportionately on any single market, financial system or geopolitical relationship.
That is a much more gradual transformation—but potentially a much more durable one.