How the War in Ukraine Is Reshaping European Security: Defence Spending, NATO and Europe’s Strategic Priorities

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed Europe’s approach to defence. Governments that once treated military spending as a relatively stable budget item are now investing more heavily in ammunition, air defence, military readiness, industrial production and protection against cyberattacks and sabotage. The war has also reinforced NATO’s central role in European security while accelerating efforts by the European Union to develop the industrial capacity, financing mechanisms and capabilities needed to defend the continent.

By October 2026, this shift is visible in both spending commitments and military planning. The European Defence Agency reported that the 27 EU member states spent €418 billion on defence in 2025, equivalent to 2.2% of their combined GDP, and projected expenditure of €454 billion in 2026. At NATO’s July 2026 Ankara Summit, allies reaffirmed collective defence, committed to developing additional military capabilities and pledged €70 billion in military equipment, assistance and training for Ukraine in 2026, with an intention to sustain at least equivalent support in 2027. These figures demonstrate the scale of the policy shift, although spending increases alone do not establish whether Europe has acquired every capability it needs.

Why the war has changed Europe’s security calculations

Before February 2022, European governments faced a range of security challenges, including terrorism, cybercrime, instability in neighbouring regions and strategic competition with major powers. Russia’s invasion brought large-scale interstate warfare back to the centre of European defence planning.

The conflict demonstrated the continuing importance of capabilities that many European militaries had allowed to shrink or had not maintained in sufficient quantities. Artillery ammunition, air-defence interceptors, armoured vehicles, military engineering, electronic warfare and logistical support all became central to sustaining a prolonged high-intensity conflict.

It also exposed the relationship between military readiness and industrial capacity. A country may possess sophisticated equipment but still struggle to sustain operations if it cannot obtain ammunition, replacement parts or trained personnel quickly enough. European governments consequently face questions about production capacity, procurement contracts, supply chains and the time required to expand defence manufacturing.

The implications extend beyond the battlefield in Ukraine. NATO members bordering Russia and Belarus have reassessed territorial defence, reinforcement plans and the protection of critical infrastructure. Countries farther west have also had to consider how quickly forces could be moved east, how military supplies would reach frontline allies and how civilian transport networks could support a crisis response.

The war has therefore changed the way European security is understood. Defence is increasingly treated as a combination of military capability, industrial resilience, infrastructure protection, intelligence, energy security and sustained political cooperation.

European defence spending: what the numbers reveal

The increase in defence budgets is one of the clearest indicators of this change, but the figures need to be interpreted carefully.

According to the European Defence Agency’s July 2026 report, defence expenditure by EU member states reached €418 billion in 2025, a 20% increase in real terms compared with 2024. The agency projected spending of €454 billion for 2026, or 2.4% of combined EU GDP. It also reported that equipment procurement reached €115 billion in 2025, while defence research and development spending was projected to increase from €17 billion in 2025 to €20 billion in 2026.

These figures represent different measures of military investment. Total defence expenditure includes more than the purchase of weapons, while procurement spending covers equipment acquisition. Research and development supports future technologies and capabilities, which may take years to reach operational units.

The practical question is whether additional funding produces the capabilities required for deterrence and defence. Buying equipment is only one step in a longer process that includes training personnel, integrating systems, establishing maintenance arrangements and ensuring that ammunition and spare parts remain available.

Europe must also manage differences between national budgets and collective capability requirements. Several countries may purchase similar equipment independently, but fragmented procurement can produce incompatible systems, higher costs and smaller production runs.

The challenge is not simply to spend more. It is to convert additional expenditure into forces that can operate together, deploy quickly and remain effective during a prolonged crisis.

NATO’s evolving role in European security

NATO remains the principal collective-defence alliance for most European countries. Its importance has grown as governments reassess the possibility of a major military confrontation and the requirements for defending allied territory.

At the June 2025 Hague Summit, NATO members reaffirmed Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and agreed to a new defence-investment commitment: 5% of GDP annually by 2035, divided into two categories. At least 3.5% is intended for core defence requirements, while up to 1.5% can cover broader defence- and security-related investment, including critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, civil preparedness and defence industrial capacity. The commitment includes annual plans and a review of the trajectory in 2029.

This is a substantial change in the alliance’s spending framework, but it is a commitment for the future, not a claim that every member already spends 5% of GDP. Countries also face different fiscal conditions, military requirements and starting points.

At the July 2026 Ankara Summit, NATO emphasised the need to develop capabilities across several domains, including integrated air and missile defence, precision strike, uncrewed systems, intelligence, space and cyber operations. The declaration also highlighted the growing responsibility of European allies and Canada for the alliance’s defence, working with the United States.

Three priorities follow from these commitments.

Deterring a conventional attack

NATO needs forces capable of responding to an attack without depending on lengthy mobilisation after a crisis has begun. This requires personnel, ammunition, air defence, armoured forces, logistics and reliable command arrangements.

Deterrence depends on an adversary’s assessment of both capability and political resolve. Equipment that cannot be deployed or sustained has limited deterrent value, while military commitments that lack credible resources may leave uncertainty about the alliance’s response.

Reinforcing Europe’s eastern flank

Countries bordering Russia and Belarus have direct concerns about warning times, airspace security, border incidents and the speed with which allied forces could reinforce them.

Eastern-flank defence therefore involves more than deploying troops near borders. It also requires transport infrastructure, pre-positioned supplies, functioning military bases, secure communications and coordination between national forces.

The ability to move reinforcements across Europe can be as important as the size of the forces available. Railways, bridges, roads, ports and border procedures all influence how quickly military support can reach a threatened area.

Strengthening transatlantic cooperation

European governments are seeking greater capacity to act while continuing to rely on NATO’s collective-defence framework and cooperation with the United States.

This creates a practical challenge: Europe needs to develop capabilities that reduce critical dependencies without undermining the advantages of operating within an integrated alliance.

The objective is not necessarily to duplicate every American capability. It is to ensure that European allies can perform essential defence tasks, contribute sufficient resources and sustain operations if US support becomes more limited or is required in another region.

What Europe’s strategic priorities now look like

The war has shifted attention towards a broader set of military and security requirements. Some are immediate, such as ammunition supplies and air defence; others involve industrial investment and infrastructure that may take years to deliver.

These priorities overlap. A drone programme, for example, requires more than the aircraft themselves: it needs communications, trained operators, intelligence, maintenance and countermeasures against electronic warfare. Similarly, air defence depends on sensors, command systems, interceptors and sufficient stocks to sustain repeated engagements.

The most important measure of progress is therefore not the number of programmes announced, but whether the resulting capabilities work together and can be sustained when demand rises sharply.

Europe’s defence industry: from emergency purchases to long-term capacity

One of the war’s most significant consequences has been renewed attention to Europe’s defence-industrial base.

When Ukraine required large quantities of ammunition and equipment, European governments faced the limitations of existing stocks and production capacity. Manufacturers could not necessarily increase output immediately because factories, specialist machinery, skilled workers and supply chains take time to expand.

Emergency purchases from abroad helped address urgent shortages, but dependence on external suppliers creates strategic questions about delivery schedules, export restrictions and competition for equipment during simultaneous crises.

The European Union’s 2025 White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 addressed these challenges by setting out a framework for increasing defence investment, supporting Ukraine and strengthening Europe’s defence-industrial and technological base. The initiative includes measures intended to make financing available and encourage cooperation among member states.

The European Commission’s Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 subsequently identified capability gaps and proposed flagship initiatives, including the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Drone Defence Initiative, the European Air Shield and the European Space Shield. The roadmap also sets political objectives for greater collaborative procurement and increased investment sourced from Europe’s defence-industrial base. These are policy targets and programmes, not evidence that all proposed capabilities are already operational.

Why joint procurement matters

Joint procurement can help countries combine demand, negotiate larger orders and establish common equipment standards. Larger and more predictable contracts can also give manufacturers greater confidence to invest in production facilities.

However, cooperation is not automatic. Governments have different operational requirements, established industrial relationships and preferences about where equipment should be manufactured. National procurement programmes can also compete with joint projects for the same budgets and factory capacity.

There is a balance to strike between speed and standardisation. A country facing an immediate capability shortage may need to purchase equipment quickly, while a longer-term programme may prioritise common systems that can be maintained and operated across several armed forces.

The objective is to avoid a situation in which increased spending produces more equipment but leaves Europe with fragmented inventories, duplicated development costs and continuing supply bottlenecks.

The economic trade-offs of higher defence spending

Defence investment can support manufacturing, engineering, research and skilled employment. It can also generate technologies that have applications beyond military markets.

But higher military expenditure has opportunity costs. Governments must decide how to finance it alongside healthcare, education, infrastructure, debt servicing and other public priorities. Borrowing can ease immediate budget pressures but may increase future interest costs; higher taxes or spending reductions create different trade-offs.

The economic effects depend on how funds are raised, where equipment is produced and whether investments improve productive capacity. An increase in defence spending should not automatically be interpreted as an equivalent increase in national economic welfare.

Long-term procurement plans therefore need credible financing, transparent oversight and evidence that projects deliver the intended capabilities at reasonable cost.

Regional security: why Europe’s geography matters

The war affects European countries differently because geography, historical experience, military capability and economic exposure vary considerably.

The Baltic states and Poland

These countries place particular emphasis on territorial defence, border security, air defence and rapid reinforcement. Their proximity to Russia and Belarus makes warning times, military mobility and allied readiness central concerns.

The Nordic region

Northern European security planning encompasses land defence, maritime access, airspace, Arctic conditions and the protection of critical infrastructure. Regional cooperation also matters for surveillance, logistics and operations in difficult weather.

The Baltic and Black Sea regions

Maritime security, surveillance, port access and the protection of undersea infrastructure are important concerns. The war has highlighted the economic and strategic consequences of attacks on shipping, energy systems and communications links.

Western and southern Europe

These countries contribute industrial capacity, transport networks, air and naval forces, logistics and strategic support. Their ability to reinforce other allies depends on infrastructure, available equipment and coordination across national systems.

These regional differences do not mean that security can be divided into separate national problems. An attack on one ally could require forces and supplies to move across several countries, making collective planning essential.

They also explain why European governments may prioritise different investments even while operating under the same NATO commitments. A country exposed to maritime threats may focus on naval capabilities, while another may place greater emphasis on air defence, land forces or military transport.

A workable European security strategy must accommodate these differences while ensuring that national capabilities contribute to a coherent collective-defence system.

Hybrid threats: the security challenge beyond the battlefield

The war has also increased attention to activities that can disrupt European societies without taking the form of a conventional military attack.

Cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation, interference with satellite services and damage to undersea cables or energy infrastructure can create uncertainty, impose economic costs and complicate crisis response.

Attribution can be difficult, particularly when evidence is incomplete or an incident could have several explanations. Governments must distinguish between confirmed hostile activity, suspected interference and ordinary technical failures rather than treating every disruption as proof of a coordinated attack.

Preparedness requires cooperation among intelligence services, law enforcement, military organisations, energy companies, telecommunications operators and other private-sector organisations that manage essential infrastructure.

Civilian resilience is also important. Emergency communications, backup power, secure data systems and continuity plans can reduce the consequences of disruptions even when their cause remains uncertain.

NATO’s 2025 defence-investment framework explicitly includes infrastructure protection, network defence and civil preparedness within its broader spending commitment. This reflects the growing recognition that military readiness depends partly on the resilience of civilian systems.

Ukraine’s role in Europe’s future security

Ukraine is central to Europe’s security debate because its defence needs are immediate and its battlefield experience has implications for military planning across the continent.

The war has demonstrated the importance of drones, electronic warfare, dispersed operations, air defence, rapid equipment adaptation and resilient logistics. Ukraine’s experience also illustrates how quickly battlefield requirements can change, placing pressure on procurement systems designed around longer development cycles.

European governments have incentives to support Ukraine’s defence while learning from these developments. Cooperation can include training, equipment production, research, maintenance and the exchange of operational lessons, subject to security restrictions and the limits of transferring experience from one battlefield to other conditions.

NATO’s July 2026 Ankara declaration reaffirmed support for Ukraine and stated that European allies and Canada were financing the vast majority of security assistance through bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Its €70 billion pledge for 2026, together with the stated intention to sustain at least equivalent assistance in 2027, underlines the continuing importance of predictable support.

Ukraine’s future security arrangements will also affect European planning. Any ceasefire or peace settlement would raise questions about deterrence, monitoring, military assistance and the risk of renewed aggression. European governments would need to consider not only the terms of a settlement but the capabilities and commitments required to support it.

The issue is therefore both immediate and structural. Ukraine needs resources to defend itself, while European countries need to ensure that their own defence planning accounts for the continuing consequences of the war.

Can Europe become more strategically autonomous?

European strategic autonomy is often discussed as the ability of European countries to act when necessary without depending entirely on external powers. In defence, this means having sufficient military capabilities, industrial capacity, intelligence, logistics and decision-making arrangements to manage critical security tasks.

The concept does not necessarily imply separation from NATO or the United States. Many European governments view stronger European capabilities as a way to reinforce the alliance, improve burden-sharing and reduce gaps that could emerge during a crisis.

The practical difficulties are substantial. European countries have different threat perceptions, budgets and strategic priorities. Some capabilities are expensive to develop, while others depend on technologies or supply chains concentrated outside Europe.

Developing a European capability also takes time. Procurement decisions, research programmes, workforce training and industrial expansion may take years before they translate into deployable forces.

For this reason, strategic autonomy is better understood as a set of measurable capabilities than as a single political status. Relevant indicators include whether European forces can deploy rapidly, maintain operations, protect essential infrastructure and obtain critical supplies when external support is constrained.

The relationship with NATO remains central to this discussion. European defence initiatives can address industrial and capability gaps, while NATO provides the established collective-defence framework for its members. The challenge is to make these arrangements complementary rather than duplicative.

The decisions that will shape Europe’s security beyond 2026

The war has accelerated a transformation in European defence, but the outcome will depend on whether governments can turn political commitments into sustainable capabilities.

Three issues deserve particular attention.

First, spending must translate into readiness. Budgets and procurement announcements matter, but their practical value depends on delivery schedules, trained personnel, ammunition stocks, maintenance and the ability to deploy forces under realistic conditions.

Second, cooperation must produce usable capacity. Joint procurement, shared standards and industrial partnerships can improve efficiency, but only if governments coordinate requirements and avoid creating new bottlenecks. National security priorities will continue to differ, making sustained political coordination necessary.

Third, European defence planning must remain adaptable. The war has shown how rapidly drones, electronic warfare and other technologies can alter operational requirements. Defence programmes need sufficient flexibility to respond to new threats without abandoning long-term planning or wasting existing investments.

There are limits to what spending figures can establish. The European Defence Agency’s data document a significant increase in resources, while NATO and EU policy documents set out intended capabilities and investment frameworks. Neither type of evidence, by itself, proves that Europe is fully prepared for every potential contingency. Readiness must be assessed through equipment availability, force structure, logistics, industrial output and the ability of governments to make decisions during a crisis.

Europe’s security environment will also depend on developments beyond the continent, including transatlantic relations, Russia’s military posture, technological competition and the conditions under which the war in Ukraine might end. These uncertainties make long-term planning essential, but they also make it important to distinguish established commitments from capabilities that remain under development.

The lasting significance of the war is that European security is increasingly being treated as a continuing investment in military capability, industrial resilience and collective preparedness rather than as a problem that can be managed through diplomacy alone. The test over the coming years will be whether higher spending, stronger cooperation and sustained support for Ukraine produce forces and institutions capable of responding to real threats—not merely meeting financial targets on paper.