Ethiopia’s search for sea access is fundamentally a geography and logistics problem. Since Eritrea became independent in 1993, Ethiopia has had no coastline and has depended on neighboring countries to move most of its international trade to and from maritime markets. Today, more than 95% of Ethiopia’s import-export trade by volume moves through the Addis Ababa–Djibouti corridor, making access to a reliable port a major economic issue rather than simply a foreign-policy ambition.
Eritrea is central because its coastline sits immediately north of Ethiopia and includes the ports of Massawa and Assab—ports that Ethiopia used when Eritrea was part of the Ethiopian state. Ethiopia therefore has a particularly direct geographic route to the Red Sea through Eritrea. But there is a crucial distinction between wanting dependable access to a port and possessing sovereign control over that port: international law recognizes landlocked states’ rights of transit to the sea while also protecting the sovereignty and legitimate interests of transit states. Any Ethiopian access through Eritrea therefore requires agreement with Eritrea rather than unilateral entitlement to Eritrean territory or ports.
Why being landlocked matters to Ethiopia
Ethiopia is one of Africa’s largest landlocked economies.
That creates a structural problem: the country’s factories, farms, consumers and exporters are located far from the ocean, while international shipping begins and ends at ports controlled by other states.
A container of machinery imported into Ethiopia, for example, may need to travel by sea to Djibouti, then through a port, customs facilities, roads or railways and inland logistics centers before reaching an Ethiopian destination. The reverse process applies to exports.
Every additional border crossing, customs procedure, road bottleneck, port delay or infrastructure failure can add time and cost.
This does not make landlocked countries inherently uncompetitive. Switzerland, Austria and other landlocked economies demonstrate that access to efficient transit networks can compensate for the absence of a coastline.
But it makes reliable access especially important.
For Ethiopia, the question is therefore not simply, “Does the country have a port?” It is: How many viable routes can Ethiopia use, how expensive are they, how predictable are they, and how much control does Ethiopia have over the logistics chain?
Ethiopia’s dependence on Djibouti
The clearest illustration is the Addis-Djibouti corridor.
The World Bank has described the corridor as a lifeline for Ethiopia and reported that more than 95% of Ethiopia’s trade by volume moves through it. The route connects Addis Ababa and Ethiopia’s inland logistics network with the Port of Djibouti through road and rail infrastructure.
This concentration has obvious advantages.
Djibouti is relatively close to Ethiopia’s main economic centers, has invested heavily in port infrastructure and is connected to Addis Ababa by a modern railway as well as major roads.
It has also produced a deeply integrated economic relationship between the two countries. Djibouti depends heavily on Ethiopian trade for port and transit revenues, while Ethiopia depends on Djibouti for maritime logistics. The World Bank has described the relationship as mutually dependent.
But concentration creates vulnerability.
If one corridor handles the overwhelming majority of a country’s trade, disruptions to that corridor can have national economic consequences. Port congestion, transport interruptions, political instability, infrastructure failures or changes in transit costs can all affect Ethiopian businesses and consumers.
That is why diversification matters even if Djibouti remains Ethiopia’s principal maritime gateway.
Sea access is about more than owning a coastline
There is an important distinction often lost in political discussions.
Ethiopia does not need to become a coastal state in order to participate in international maritime trade.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea recognizes that landlocked states have a right of access to and from the sea and freedom of transit through transit states. But the same framework explicitly protects the sovereignty and legitimate interests of those transit states, and the practical terms of transit are to be established through agreements.
In practical terms, Ethiopia can pursue several forms of maritime access without acquiring territory:
- long-term port leases;
- commercial port agreements;
- dedicated cargo terminals;
- road and railway corridors;
- customs arrangements;
- free-trade or logistics zones;
- joint infrastructure investments;
- shipping and warehousing agreements.
These arrangements can provide substantial economic access without changing international borders.
That distinction becomes particularly important when discussing Eritrea.
Why Eritrea is geographically different from Ethiopia’s other options
Eritrea is not simply another potential transit country.
It occupies the Red Sea coastline immediately north of Ethiopia and controls two historically important ports: Massawa on the central coast and Assab in the south.
The geography makes the attraction obvious.
Assab lies relatively close to northern Ethiopia, while Massawa provides another Red Sea outlet. Ethiopia also has historical experience using Eritrean ports for international commerce.
Before Eritrea’s independence, Ethiopia’s economy was connected to the Red Sea through these coastal gateways. A transit agreement concluded in 1993 between the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea explicitly provided for Assab and Massawa to serve as transit ports for Ethiopian goods.
The geography therefore creates a powerful historical memory: Ethiopia once had direct territorial access to the Red Sea through what is now Eritrea.
But historical access is not a present-day legal entitlement.
Eritrea has been a sovereign state since 1993, and its ports and territory are under Eritrean sovereignty.
The two Eritrean ports have different strategic value
| Route or port | Why it matters to Ethiopia | Main limitation or consideration |
|---|---|---|
| Djibouti | Established infrastructure, major existing trade route and strong road/rail connections to Addis Ababa | Heavy concentration of Ethiopian trade in one corridor |
| Assab, Eritrea | Southern Red Sea location and relatively close to northern Ethiopia; historically used by Ethiopia | Requires a political and commercial arrangement with Eritrea |
| Massawa, Eritrea | Northern Red Sea port with historical links to Ethiopia and access to maritime shipping | Distance and infrastructure considerations, plus the political relationship with Eritrea |
| Berbera, Somaliland | Provides another diversification route and has received major port investment | Requires transit through a politically complex regional environment |
| Port Sudan, Sudan | Provides another Red Sea outlet, particularly relevant to western/northern Ethiopia | Sudan’s prolonged war makes the route highly vulnerable |
| Mombasa/Lamu, Kenya | Gives Ethiopia access through Kenya and diversifies maritime options | Longer overland routes for much of Ethiopia compared with Djibouti |
World Bank assessments have identified Djibouti as overwhelmingly dominant in Ethiopia’s maritime trade, while Berbera and Port Sudan have accounted for much smaller shares. Ethiopia’s interest in multiple corridors is therefore best understood as risk diversification, not necessarily an effort to abandon Djibouti.
What Ethiopia actually gains from more port options
A second or third maritime route could improve Ethiopia’s bargaining position even if most cargo continued to move through Djibouti.
Consider a simple logistics problem.
If an importer has only one practical route, the importer has little flexibility when that route becomes congested or expensive. If several routes are commercially viable, cargo can potentially be shifted according to price, capacity and reliability.
For a country the size of Ethiopia, that flexibility can have significant economic value.
It can also support different regions differently. A port serving northern Ethiopia does not have to compete directly with Djibouti for every shipment. Geographic proximity can make one corridor more efficient for particular cities, industries or agricultural areas.
This is why Ethiopia’s maritime strategy includes both access and diversification.
The economics behind the political language
Ethiopian officials increasingly describe maritime access as essential to long-term economic development.
In February 2026, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed told Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that Ethiopia’s growth required addressing logistical and maritime-access constraints, describing Ethiopia’s landlocked position as a structural problem.
The economic logic is straightforward.
Ethiopia is trying to expand manufacturing, agricultural exports and private-sector activity. That requires reliable access to imported machinery, industrial inputs, fuel, consumer goods and international markets.
A country’s port strategy therefore affects much more than shipping companies.
It can influence:
- the price of imported goods;
- the cost of industrial inputs;
- export competitiveness;
- inventory requirements;
- delivery times;
- foreign-exchange pressures;
- investment decisions;
- supply-chain resilience.
The World Bank’s recent work on Ethiopia’s Modjo Dry Port illustrates the same point from the inland side. Expanded facilities have reduced processing times in some operations and are intended to support both imports and a larger flow of exports.
The port is only one part of the system. Roads, railways, customs, warehouses and inland dry ports all determine how useful maritime access actually becomes.
Why Ethiopia cannot simply build its own port
A common misconception is that Ethiopia could solve the problem by simply constructing a port.
A port has to sit on a coastline.
Ethiopia’s territory has no coastline, so a genuinely Ethiopian seaport would require either territorial change or a long-term arrangement with a neighboring coastal state.
That is why Ethiopia’s maritime strategy is inherently diplomatic.
It needs agreements with countries that control potential gateways.
And those countries have their own interests.
Djibouti wants to preserve its position as a regional logistics hub. Somalia and Somaliland have their own sovereignty and territorial questions. Sudan’s ports are affected by the country’s internal war. Kenya wants to develop its own maritime corridors. Eritrea wants to preserve control over its territory and ports.
Ethiopia therefore has to balance economic diversification against the political sensitivities of every potential transit state.
Why Eritrea’s Assab is especially sensitive
Assab is the most politically sensitive option because of the history between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
The port was part of Ethiopia’s maritime infrastructure before Eritrea’s independence. During the 1998–2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea war, the two countries fought directly, and the border remained militarized for years afterward.
The relationship improved dramatically in 2018, when Abiy and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki signed a peace declaration. Ethiopia subsequently expressed interest in reopening transport connections to Eritrean ports.
That rapprochement eventually became a military partnership during the Tigray war.
But the partnership later deteriorated.
This history means that an Ethiopian request for access to Assab cannot be interpreted purely as a commercial proposal. Eritrean policymakers inevitably have to consider its military and strategic implications.
A commercial arrangement that appears limited to port use could potentially give Ethiopia infrastructure, logistics capabilities or a long-term presence on Eritrea’s coast.
From Ethiopia’s perspective, those same arrangements could simply represent normal economic access for a large landlocked economy.
The disagreement is therefore partly about what access means.
Access versus sovereignty
This is the central distinction in the entire debate.
Ethiopia can reasonably argue that its geography creates a strong economic interest in dependable access to the sea.
Eritrea can simultaneously insist that access does not give Ethiopia ownership or sovereign rights over Eritrean territory.
International law broadly accommodates both positions. UNCLOS provides landlocked states with rights concerning access and transit, while explicitly preserving the sovereignty and legitimate interests of transit states. The detailed terms have to be agreed between the countries involved.
That creates room for negotiation.
A long-term lease, for example, is fundamentally different from territorial sovereignty. A dedicated Ethiopian commercial terminal is different from an Ethiopian military base. A transit corridor is different from a change in the international border.
Much of the future debate will depend on whether Ethiopia and its neighbors can keep these distinctions clear.
Ethiopia has alternatives to Eritrea
Eritrea is strategically important, but it is not Ethiopia’s only possible maritime partner.
Djibouti
Djibouti is the established gateway.
Its enormous importance means Ethiopia has strong reasons to continue investing in the corridor even while seeking alternatives. The World Bank’s 2023 regional corridor project specifically aimed to improve the road and logistics infrastructure connecting Ethiopia to Djibouti.
Berbera
The port of Berbera in Somaliland has become an important part of discussions about Ethiopian trade diversification.
Ethiopia has long considered Berbera a potential alternative corridor, while investment in the port and its connecting infrastructure has increased its commercial importance.
But Berbera also sits inside the unresolved political question surrounding Somaliland’s status, making the route more than a simple logistics project.
Port Sudan
Port Sudan offers another Red Sea route.
Geographically, it can be particularly relevant to western and northern Ethiopian markets. But Sudan’s ongoing conflict has substantially complicated the reliability of the corridor.
Kenya
Kenyan ports offer another potential route to the Indian Ocean.
For parts of southern Ethiopia, a Kenyan corridor can make geographic sense. But the overland distance and infrastructure requirements limit its ability to replace Djibouti for Ethiopia as a whole.
The strategic objective is therefore not necessarily to identify one perfect port. It is to develop enough alternatives that Ethiopia is not excessively dependent on any single external gateway.
Why Red Sea geography matters beyond Ethiopia and Eritrea
The Red Sea is not an isolated body of water.
Its southern entrance, the Bab el-Mandeb, connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean shipping system. That places Ethiopia’s hinterland close to one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.
Ethiopia’s location is unusual: although it has no coastline, a very large population and economy sit immediately adjacent to the Red Sea system.
This creates a mismatch between political geography and economic geography.
Ethiopia is inland politically but deeply connected to maritime trade economically.
That is why Ethiopian policymakers can regard sea access as a national strategic issue even though the country does not possess a coastline.
What sea access would not solve
It would be a mistake to assume that obtaining a port automatically transforms Ethiopia’s economic position.
Ports are only useful when connected to functioning inland logistics.
A new maritime outlet would still require:
- roads or railways;
- customs agreements;
- reliable border crossings;
- warehouses and dry ports;
- container-handling capacity;
- fuel and electricity;
- shipping services;
- predictable regulations;
- security along the corridor.
Ethiopia’s experience with Djibouti demonstrates this.
The country already has a major port connection, yet the World Bank has identified congestion, customs processes, infrastructure constraints and coordination problems as factors affecting logistics performance.
A new port therefore solves only one part of the problem.
The strategic value of diversification
There is also a distinction between commercial access and strategic access.
Commercial access means Ethiopian businesses can use a foreign port under agreed conditions.
Strategic access means Ethiopia has enough alternative routes that disruption at one gateway does not threaten the national economy.
The second objective may ultimately be more important than simply obtaining a port on the Red Sea.
If Ethiopia can use Djibouti, Berbera, Kenyan ports and potentially Eritrean ports under stable commercial arrangements, the country becomes less vulnerable to political or logistical disruption at any one gateway.
That would also change Ethiopia’s negotiating position with its neighbors.
Diversification can create bargaining power without requiring territorial control.
Why Eritrea sees the issue differently
For Eritrea, Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions have to be viewed through a history of conflict.
Eritrea fought for independence from Ethiopia. The two states then fought a major interstate war. Their governments later reconciled, cooperated militarily and subsequently returned to confrontation.
Against that background, a request for long-term access to Eritrean ports raises questions that a purely economic analysis cannot answer.
What infrastructure would Ethiopia receive?
How long would an agreement last?
Would Ethiopian security personnel be involved?
Would Ethiopia obtain a military presence?
Who would control the port?
What would happen if the two governments disagreed?
Could commercial infrastructure be converted to military use?
These are not necessarily accusations. They are the kinds of strategic questions a sovereign coastal state can reasonably be expected to ask when a much larger neighboring country seeks maritime access.
The key misconception: sea access does not have to mean a new coastline
The most useful way to understand Ethiopia’s objective is to separate three concepts:
Access: the ability to move Ethiopian goods through a foreign port.
Control: the ability to operate or manage facilities under a commercial or contractual arrangement.
Sovereignty: legal ownership of territory and the coastal waters associated with it.
These are not interchangeable.
Ethiopia can pursue the first without possessing the third.
That distinction leaves considerable room for negotiated solutions. It also explains why the maritime question does not have to become a territorial dispute.
The difficulty is political trust.
The question Ethiopia ultimately has to answer
Ethiopia’s case for diversified sea access has a strong geographic and economic foundation. A country of its size cannot easily eliminate the disadvantages of being landlocked, and concentrating more than 90% of trade through a single neighboring corridor creates obvious logistical exposure.
But geography does not determine the political terms of access.
Eritrea controls its own coastline. Djibouti controls its ports. Somaliland’s status remains disputed. Sudan is dealing with war. Kenya controls its own maritime infrastructure. Each potential corridor therefore comes with a different combination of distance, cost, infrastructure and political risk.
The most sustainable Ethiopian strategy is consequently unlikely to be about obtaining one particular port at any cost. It is more plausibly about building a diversified network of commercially reliable corridors while maintaining workable relationships with the states that control them.
For Eritrea, the challenge is equally clear: Ethiopia’s need for maritime access is unlikely to disappear simply because political tensions rise. The long-term question is whether that need can be converted into a mutually beneficial commercial arrangement—or whether geography, history and security fears will continue to turn a logistics problem into a geopolitical confrontation.