Eritrea has gone more than three decades without a national election. Since independence in 1993, President Isaias Afwerki has remained in power without facing a national presidential vote, while the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) remains the country’s only permitted political party. The government has also never implemented the 1997 constitution, which was designed to establish elected institutions, presidential term limits and other checks on executive power.
The explanation is therefore deeper than repeated election postponements. Eritrea’s constitutional system never became operational. The national legislature has been inactive, an independent electoral system has not been established, opposition parties and independent civic organizations cannot operate domestically, and independent media have been banned since 2001. Without those institutions, there is no functioning political competition through which voters could choose an alternative government.
1993 Was Independence, Not a Competitive Election
Eritrea became independent from Ethiopia in 1993 after decades of armed struggle. A referendum held that year overwhelmingly endorsed independence.
But that referendum was not a presidential or parliamentary election. It asked Eritreans whether they supported independence.
After independence, Isaias Afwerki became president through the transitional political arrangements established by the former liberation movement. He has remained president ever since.
That distinction is important because the modern Eritrean political system did not begin with a functioning multiparty electoral system that was later suspended. Instead, the country moved from a liberation movement into a transitional system that was supposed to develop into constitutional government.
That transition never fully occurred.
The 1997 Constitution Promised a Different Political System
Eritrea’s 1997 Constitution is at the center of the story.
The constitution states that Eritrean citizens aged 18 and above have the right to vote. It establishes a National Assembly as the country’s supreme representative and legislative body, with members to be elected by secret ballot. Its normal term is five years.
The constitutional system also gives the National Assembly significant authority.
It is supposed to:
- enact laws;
- approve the national budget;
- oversee the execution of laws;
- approve certain major national decisions;
- elect the president; and
- have the power to impeach the president under specified circumstances.
The president, under the constitution, is supposed to be elected by the National Assembly for a five-year term, with a maximum of two terms.
In other words, the constitution provides a mechanism through which presidential power would ultimately depend on an elected legislature.
That system was never put into practice.
Human Rights Watch and Freedom House both continue to report that the 1997 constitution has never been implemented.
| Democratic institution | What the 1997 Constitution envisioned | What exists in practice |
|---|---|---|
| National elections | Regular elections for the National Assembly | No national election since independence |
| National Assembly | Representatives elected by citizens | Legislature has been inactive for years |
| Presidency | President elected by the National Assembly for five years | Isaias Afwerki has remained president since 1993 |
| Presidential tenure | Maximum of two terms | Constitutional term limits have not operated |
| Political competition | Representative government under constitutional rules | PFDJ remains the only permitted political party |
| Independent information | Constitutional protection for political rights and freedoms | Independent domestic media remain banned |
| Electoral administration | Constitutional electoral framework | No functioning competitive national electoral system |
Why Was the Constitution Never Implemented?
The Eritrean government has historically linked political restrictions to national security and the country’s conflict with Ethiopia.
The Eritrea-Ethiopia border war began in 1998, shortly after the constitution was ratified. That conflict became an important justification for maintaining a highly centralized and security-focused political system.
But the war ended in 2000, while the absence of constitutional government continued.
Human Rights Watch reported that elections were initially canceled during the border conflict and subsequently remained unscheduled.
The longer-term explanation is therefore institutional.
The government did not simply postpone one election and then another while preserving an independent electoral system. The political institutions required for competitive national elections never became fully operational.
That distinction helps explain why more than 30 years have passed without a national electoral contest.
The PFDJ Has a Political Monopoly
The People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, or PFDJ, emerged from the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, the movement that led the independence struggle.
It became the governing political organization after independence.
Today, it remains the only permitted political party inside Eritrea. Freedom House describes the PFDJ, headed by President Isaias Afwerki, as the country’s sole political party.
That creates a fundamental problem for competitive elections.
An election is meaningful when voters have a genuine choice between competing political programs and candidates. Political parties provide one of the principal mechanisms for organizing that competition.
If only one political party is permitted, changing the government through a conventional multiparty election becomes extraordinarily difficult.
Opposition movements and organizations exist among Eritreans abroad, but this is fundamentally different from allowing political competition inside the country.
Human Rights Watch reports that there are currently no opposition parties or independent civic organizations operating domestically.
Eritrea’s Legislature Has Not Provided a Check on Presidential Power
The constitution gives the National Assembly substantial powers, including electing the president and overseeing government activity.
But those powers depend on the legislature actually functioning.
Human Rights Watch’s 2026 assessment says the legislature has not met since 2010.
This means that the constitutional mechanism designed to make the presidency accountable to an elected legislature has not operated as intended.
The result is a striking institutional gap: the constitution describes a system in which the president is selected and constrained through representative institutions, while the actual political system has concentrated authority in the presidency.
That gap is one of the most important facts for understanding Eritrea.
Opposition Restrictions Make an Election More Than a Question of Ballots
Even if the government announced an election tomorrow, a credible competitive vote would require much more than opening polling stations.
Political organizations would need to be able to form and campaign.
Candidates would need to communicate their programs.
Citizens would need to be able to organize meetings and associations.
Journalists would need to investigate candidates and government performance.
Voters would need access to competing information.
Election administrators would need sufficient independence to register voters, organize polling, count ballots and resolve disputes.
Those conditions are largely absent.
Human Rights Watch reports that Eritrea’s civic space remains closed, with no opposition parties, independent civic organizations or independent media operating domestically. Nongovernmental gatherings involving more than seven people are also prohibited.
This makes the problem structural rather than procedural.
The question is not simply “When will Eritrea schedule an election?”
It is “What political system would allow an election to be genuinely competitive?”
Independent Media Were Shut Down in 2001
Control of information is another major part of the political system.
In September 2001, Eritrean authorities closed the country’s independent newspapers and arrested journalists and other critics. Independent media have remained banned ever since.
The crackdown came during a broader confrontation between President Afwerki’s government and prominent figures within the ruling establishment who had called for political reform and implementation of the constitution.
Human Rights Watch has documented the closure of independent newspapers and the detention of senior political figures and journalists following the 2001 crackdown.
The absence of independent media matters because elections are not meaningful simply because people cast ballots.
Voters need information with which to judge those seeking power.
Independent journalists can investigate government decisions, expose corruption, question official claims and give competing political groups a platform.
Without those functions, the information environment is heavily controlled by the state.
For comparison, modern electoral transparency initiatives increasingly focus on independent verification and public access to election information. The discussion of crowdsourced vote tallies, AI and blockchain in Kenya’s elections illustrates how technology can potentially strengthen scrutiny around elections—but technology cannot substitute for political freedoms or independent institutions.
Why Regional Security Has Mattered
Eritrea’s political development cannot be separated entirely from its regional environment.
The country emerged from a prolonged war of independence and subsequently fought Ethiopia again in the late 1990s. Eritrea has also been involved in wider conflicts and security disputes in the Horn of Africa.
Those circumstances have helped the government maintain a strong national-security justification for centralized rule.
But security concerns do not explain the entire three-decade period.
The Eritrea-Ethiopia border war ended in 2000, yet the constitutional system was not subsequently implemented. Human Rights Watch continues to describe Eritrea as a highly centralized state in which the government maintains extensive restrictions on political and civil rights.
The persistence of the system therefore cannot be explained solely by a temporary wartime emergency.
The Difference Between a Constitution and Constitutional Government
Eritrea offers an unusual example of why having a written constitution is not the same as operating under constitutional government.
The 1997 document contains many of the formal features associated with representative government: voting rights, an elected legislature, presidential elections through the legislature, defined terms of office and mechanisms for executive accountability.
But those provisions require institutions capable of enforcing them.
If the legislature does not function, its power to oversee the executive disappears.
If political parties cannot compete, voting cannot provide meaningful political choice.
If independent media cannot operate, citizens have fewer independent sources of information.
If an electoral authority lacks genuine independence, the existence of a ballot does not by itself establish a credible election.
This is why the 1997 constitution is so important to understanding Eritrea: it demonstrates that the absence of elections is not simply the result of there being no constitutional blueprint.
The blueprint exists.
The institutions needed to activate it do not.
Could Eritrea Hold an Election Without Changing the System?
Technically, the government could organize a vote.
But a national election would not automatically be a democratic election.
A meaningful transition would require several institutional changes to occur together.
Political parties would need legal space to organize. Civil society would need room to operate. Independent journalists would need to work without fear of detention. Election administrators would need to operate independently enough to manage voting and counting. The legislature would need to function, and courts or other mechanisms would need to provide avenues for challenging electoral disputes.
The constitutional order would also need to be implemented or legitimately revised.
This is why simply announcing an election date would not resolve Eritrea’s political problem.
The credibility of the election would depend on what happens before election day.
What Has Happened to Political Participation?
There is an important distinction between national elections and all forms of political participation in Eritrea.
Eritrea has conducted some local or regional elections over the years. Human Rights Watch reported, for example, that regional assembly elections were held in 2004, while noting that the institutions involved had limited power.
Those elections should not be confused with a competitive national system in which voters can choose a president or a national government from competing political parties.
The national political question remains unresolved.
Freedom House’s 2026 assessment gives Eritrea a score of 3 out of 100 and classifies it as “Not Free.” It gives the country zero points on whether the current national leadership and national legislators are chosen through free and fair elections, and zero on whether political parties can compete without undue obstacles.
What Would Have to Change?
For Eritrea to move from its current system toward competitive national elections, the most important changes would be institutional rather than merely electoral.
The country would need to establish a credible framework for:
- implementing or legitimately revising the constitutional system;
- holding regular national elections;
- allowing political parties to organize and compete;
- establishing an independent election-management body;
- restoring independent media;
- reopening civic space;
- enabling meaningful legislative oversight; and
- providing mechanisms for candidates and voters to challenge electoral abuses.
None of these changes guarantees a particular electoral outcome.
They would instead create the conditions under which Eritreans could determine that outcome themselves.
That distinction is important. The purpose of democratic reform is not to predetermine who wins, but to establish rules under which political power can change hands peacefully and legitimately.
The Question Eritrea Still Has Not Answered
As of 2026, Eritrea remains a country where the same president has been in power since independence, the PFDJ remains the only permitted political party, the 1997 constitution remains unimplemented, the legislature is inactive, and independent domestic media are prohibited.
The most revealing fact is therefore not simply that Eritrea has gone more than three decades without a national election.
It is that the institutions that would make such an election meaningful have never been allowed to fully develop.
Until political competition, independent information, legislative oversight and constitutional limits on executive power become operational, an election date alone would not resolve the country’s central political problem. The real test for Eritrea will be whether it can finally turn the democratic institutions written into its constitutional framework into institutions that function in practice.