The Pretoria Agreement, formally the Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities, was signed on November 2, 2022, by Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Negotiated in Pretoria, South Africa, under African Union mediation, it ended the main phase of a devastating two-year war by stopping large-scale hostilities and establishing a framework for disarmament, humanitarian access, restoration of services, political dialogue and transitional justice. The agreement was a turning point because neither side had achieved a durable military solution, but it was a ceasefire and political framework—not a complete settlement of every dispute that had caused the war.
The distinction remains crucial. The agreement significantly reduced violence and enabled humanitarian and economic recovery, but some of its most difficult commitments—particularly the status of contested territories, the return of displaced people, transitional justice, disarmament and political normalization—have proved harder to implement. The African Union continues to describe the Pretoria agreement as the foundation for peace in Tigray, while repeatedly calling for dialogue over unresolved issues. Renewed tensions in 2025 and 2026 have demonstrated how much of the underlying political settlement remains incomplete.
Why the Pretoria Agreement was necessary
The Tigray war began in November 2020 after a prolonged political confrontation between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF-led authorities in Tigray.
What began as a struggle over constitutional authority and political power developed into a much wider war involving the Ethiopian National Defense Force, Tigrayan forces, Eritrean troops, Amhara forces and other armed actors.
The conflict produced mass displacement, severe disruption to food supplies and health services, destruction of infrastructure and extensive allegations of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.
By 2022, neither side had secured a political outcome through military means.
The federal government had regained substantial territory after Tigrayan forces made major advances in 2021. Tigrayan forces nevertheless retained significant military capabilities and the ability to continue fighting.
The humanitarian and economic costs were also enormous.
The political calculation increasingly shifted toward negotiation.
How the Pretoria talks worked
The negotiations were facilitated by the African Union and hosted by South Africa.
The AU appointed a high-level mediation team led by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, with former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and former South African deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka also involved.
The talks lasted roughly ten days before the parties signed the cessation-of-hostilities agreement.
That African-led character was politically significant.
The agreement was presented as an African diplomatic effort to resolve an African conflict, while international partners—including the United States, European Union and United Nations—supported the wider peace process. The AU subsequently established a Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission to oversee implementation.
What the agreement actually committed the parties to
The Pretoria document addressed several interconnected problems rather than simply declaring a ceasefire.
Its central commitments included:
- permanently ending hostilities;
- protecting civilians;
- restoring humanitarian access;
- restoring essential services;
- disarming Tigrayan forces;
- restoring constitutional order and federal authority;
- facilitating political dialogue;
- addressing humanitarian and displacement issues;
- establishing mechanisms connected to accountability and transitional justice;
- supporting the rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants.
The agreement therefore attempted to move Tigray from war to a managed political transition.
That is why implementation became just as important as the original signature.
The most immediate achievement: the guns fell silent
The clearest success was the cessation of large-scale fighting.
That sounds straightforward, but after two years of war it was a major achievement.
The African Union reported that the agreement led to the immediate cessation of hostilities, followed by the handover of heavy and medium weapons, restoration of essential services, reopening of schools and the resumption of commercial activity in much of Tigray.
The agreement also created a mechanism for monitoring compliance.
The AU Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission was launched in December 2022, with personnel deployed to Tigray to monitor implementation.
This mattered because ceasefires are fragile when neither side trusts the other.
Independent monitoring cannot eliminate political disagreements, but it can make violations easier to document and reduce the risk that every accusation immediately becomes a military response.
Disarmament was one of the hardest commitments
The agreement required Tigrayan forces to disarm.
This was essential to the peace process because maintaining large independent armed forces inside a regional state would make a return to political competition through normal institutions difficult.
But disarmament was never simply a technical exercise.
For Tigrayan leaders and communities, weapons were also connected to security concerns. Tigray shares a border with Eritrea, and the war had demonstrated how quickly external military forces could enter the region.
For the federal government, meanwhile, the existence of a large regional military force represented a challenge to the authority of the national state.
The agreement therefore had to balance two competing requirements:
Tigray needed enough security to trust the peace process, while the federal government needed the armed confrontation with the TPLF to end.
The AU subsequently reported progress in the handover of heavy and medium weapons and moved toward a broader disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. It also established a National Commission for Reintegration with Ethiopian government participation.
But disarmament did not automatically resolve the political question of who would provide security in contested areas.
Humanitarian access was another immediate priority
During the war, access to Tigray was severely restricted for extended periods.
The Pretoria agreement committed the parties to facilitating humanitarian assistance.
That opened the way for aid operations to expand, although the humanitarian situation did not suddenly normalize when the agreement was signed.
The destruction of roads, health facilities, communications infrastructure, homes and livelihoods meant that stopping the fighting was only the beginning of recovery.
Millions of people had been affected directly or indirectly by the conflict.
Humanitarian recovery therefore required not only food deliveries but also functioning markets, health services, schools, electricity, telecommunications and transportation.
The AU subsequently reported the restoration of basic services and reopening of schools and economic activities as important implementation milestones.
Restoring services was more than reconstruction
The restoration of services had a political dimension.
A central question after the war was whether Tigray would remain isolated from Ethiopia’s federal institutions or become reintegrated into the country’s administrative and economic system.
Restoring banking, telecommunications, transport and government services therefore helped reconnect Tigray to the wider Ethiopian state.
At the same time, Tigray needed a functioning regional administration capable of managing everyday government.
The Pretoria process consequently produced an Interim Regional Administration of Tigray.
The AU identified the establishment of this administration as one of the significant milestones in implementing the agreement.
But creating an interim government did not settle the region’s longer-term political leadership.
The territorial question was never fully solved
One of the most difficult issues left behind by the war concerns territory.
During the conflict, forces associated with Amhara regional authorities and militias took control of areas that Tigrayan authorities regarded as part of Tigray.
Western Tigray became particularly contentious.
The territory is claimed by competing communities and political authorities, and the war produced large-scale displacement.
The Pretoria agreement did not simply erase those competing claims.
Instead, it created a framework in which contested areas were supposed to be addressed through political processes.
In April 2024, the African Union specifically called for political dialogue over contested areas including Raya Alamata, Zata and Ofla, warning that renewed local tensions were causing displacement and urging full implementation of the Pretoria agreement.
This illustrates one of the agreement’s central limitations: ending the shooting does not determine who ultimately governs disputed territory.
Displaced people remain central to the peace process
Displacement is closely connected to the territorial question.
People cannot permanently return simply because a peace agreement has been signed.
A sustainable return requires security, homes, property rights, local administration and access to basic services.
It also raises difficult questions about communities that moved into contested areas during or after the conflict.
The African Union has continued to link implementation of the peace process with the return of internally displaced people and broader reconciliation. Its later reporting called for continued support for DDR and IDP-return initiatives.
This is one reason the territorial dispute cannot be treated as a separate technical question.
Territory determines administration; administration affects security; security determines whether displaced people can return.
Eritrean forces created another unresolved problem
The presence of Eritrean forces in Tigray was one of the most sensitive issues surrounding the peace process.
Eritrea had fought alongside Ethiopian federal forces during the Tigray war. Eritrean troops were accused by international investigators and human-rights organizations of serious abuses in Tigray, allegations Eritrea rejected.
Yet Eritrea was not a signatory to the Pretoria agreement.
That created a structural problem.
The agreement could directly bind the Ethiopian government and TPLF, but it could not by itself settle the position of a third country whose troops had participated in the conflict.
The withdrawal of foreign forces therefore remained an important part of the post-war security environment.
The distinction is significant because a peace agreement between two parties cannot automatically resolve military deployments by a third.
Transitional justice was deliberately left as a longer process
The war produced extensive allegations of atrocities by multiple parties.
These included killings of civilians, sexual violence, torture, arbitrary detention, forced displacement and other abuses.
The Pretoria agreement recognized the need for accountability and transitional justice.
But accountability is much harder than signing a commitment to pursue it.
The parties had to confront competing demands:
- victims seeking justice;
- communities seeking recognition of their suffering;
- authorities seeking national reconciliation;
- concerns about political destabilization;
- questions about which courts should hear cases;
- questions about evidence and investigations;
- disagreements over who should be held responsible.
The African Union’s Commission of Inquiry into the human-rights situation in Tigray had its mandate terminated in 2023 after the Ethiopian government established a national transitional-justice process. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights said the national process was intended to address accountability, truth-seeking, redress and reconciliation.
That decision did not mean the underlying allegations disappeared.
It shifted much of the responsibility for addressing them toward Ethiopian institutions.
Why justice can complicate peace
There is a fundamental tension in post-war settlements.
A government may fear that aggressive prosecution could destabilize a fragile political settlement.
Victims may fear that avoiding prosecution simply rewards those responsible for abuses.
A peace agreement therefore has to balance stability with accountability.
The Pretoria process did not fully resolve that tension.
This is one reason transitional justice remains an important measure of whether the agreement produces reconciliation rather than merely a prolonged pause in violence.
The agreement also changed Ethiopia’s political landscape
The Pretoria settlement was not simply a military arrangement.
It represented a major shift in Ethiopia’s political balance.
The TPLF had previously been the dominant political force in Ethiopia’s federal ruling coalition for decades. By the time of the Pretoria negotiations, it was fighting for its survival and regional autonomy from Tigray.
The agreement therefore marked the end of an era in which the TPLF could challenge the federal government primarily through military power.
At the same time, the agreement did not resolve Ethiopia’s broader debate over federalism, ethnic political organization and the distribution of power between Addis Ababa and the regions.
That distinction matters because the Tigray war was partly an expression of a larger constitutional and political dispute.
Ending the Tigray war did not settle that national debate.
The implementation mechanism mattered almost as much as the agreement
One of Pretoria’s important features was the creation of mechanisms to monitor implementation.
The AU Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission provided a continuing international role after the negotiators left South Africa.
The parties also established joint structures to address implementation.
By 2024, the AU reported that senior commanders had met in Nairobi and that the High-Level Panel, Joint Committee and monitoring mission were working together on implementation.
This architecture reflects a basic lesson of peace processes:
A signed agreement changes little unless there are institutions capable of translating its commitments into actions.
The existence of those institutions did not guarantee success, but it gave the parties mechanisms for managing disputes without immediately returning to war.
What the Pretoria Agreement achieved
By the first anniversary of the agreement, the AU could point to several concrete changes:
- large-scale hostilities had stopped;
- heavy and medium weapons had been handed over;
- essential services had resumed;
- schools and economic activity had reopened;
- an interim regional administration had been established;
- a transitional-justice working process existed;
- a national reintegration commission had been created;
- AU monitoring mechanisms were operating.
Those are significant achievements.
They demonstrate that Pretoria was more than a symbolic declaration.
But they should not be confused with a completed peace settlement.
What remained unresolved
The unresolved issues can be grouped into several broad categories.
| Issue | What Pretoria addressed | What remained difficult |
|---|---|---|
| Security | Permanent cessation of hostilities and military disengagement | Preventing renewed mobilization and rebuilding trust |
| Disarmament | Commitment to disarm Tigrayan forces | Completing DDR and addressing long-term security concerns |
| Humanitarian recovery | Access and restoration of services | Rebuilding infrastructure, livelihoods and health systems |
| Territory | Framework for political dialogue | Status of contested areas and competing territorial claims |
| Displacement | Peace environment for returns | Safe, voluntary and sustainable return of displaced people |
| Justice | Transitional-justice framework | Accountability, investigations, reparations and reconciliation |
| Governance | Interim regional administration | Longer-term political legitimacy and regional authority |
| External forces | Framework for ending hostilities | Eritrea was outside the agreement, leaving a separate security question |
| National politics | Recognition of constitutional and political processes | Ethiopia’s wider federalism and power-sharing disputes remained |
The key pattern is clear: the agreement was strongest where the problem could be defined as stopping military activity and weaker where the problem required political consensus.
The gap between peace and normalization
A country can be at peace without having resolved the political issues that caused a war.
That is essentially what happened after Pretoria.
People could return to schools.
Commercial transport could resume.
Electricity and communications could be restored.
Weapons could be collected.
But political disagreements over territory, authority, accountability and security could remain.
This creates what might be called a post-war peace gap: the distance between the absence of large-scale fighting and the existence of a political settlement that all major actors regard as legitimate.
Tigray’s experience demonstrates why that gap matters.
Renewed tensions tested the agreement
The Pretoria framework survived several years, but tensions did not disappear.
In March 2025, the African Union expressed concern about developments within the TPLF and urged all parties to uphold their obligations under the permanent cessation-of-hostilities agreement.
In January 2026, the AU again called for restraint amid developments in Tigray and emphasized that outstanding issues should be resolved through dialogue within the Pretoria framework.
By September 2026, the situation had deteriorated significantly.
The AU reported renewed military escalation in northern Ethiopia, including the seizure of airports in Mekelle, Axum and Shire by Tigrayan forces, fighting in parts of southern Tigray and Afar, and the formation of new political and military alliances.
The AU explicitly stated that these developments risked reversing the gains made since the 2022 agreement and called for direct talks under its framework.
This does not erase what Pretoria accomplished. It demonstrates the difference between ending a war and resolving the conflict’s underlying political structure.
Why Pretoria still matters
Despite its limitations, Pretoria remains the principal reference point for resolving the Tigray conflict.
The agreement established a framework that both sides accepted after two years of war. It demonstrated that military confrontation could be replaced by negotiation and created institutions for monitoring and implementation.
The African Union continues to describe it as the foundation for sustainable peace in Tigray.
That gives the agreement continuing political importance even when implementation becomes difficult.
The alternative is not a return to the negotiating table with no framework at all. Pretoria provides an existing framework that can be used, amended or strengthened.
What lasting peace would require
A durable settlement would need to move beyond the question of whether the guns are silent.
It would require credible progress on disputed territories, sustainable returns for displaced people, completion of disarmament and reintegration, functioning regional institutions, meaningful transitional justice and a political process capable of addressing disagreements without turning them into armed confrontation.
It would also require Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan political actors to develop enough trust to treat political competition as something that can be managed through institutions rather than military deterrence.
That is a much harder task than negotiating a ceasefire.
The real test of Pretoria
The Pretoria Agreement succeeded at its most immediate objective: it stopped the principal phase of the Tigray war and created space for humanitarian recovery and political engagement.
But a peace agreement becomes durable only when the political questions behind the war can be managed without renewed violence.
For Tigray, those questions include who governs, which territories belong under which administration, how displaced people return, how former combatants are reintegrated and how victims obtain justice. For Ethiopia more broadly, they include the balance between federal authority and regional autonomy and whether political disagreements can be settled without armed confrontation.
That is why Pretoria should be understood neither as a failed peace agreement nor as a completed settlement. It is better understood as a framework whose greatest achievement was ending the war and whose greatest challenge is still unfinished: turning the absence of battlefield fighting into a political order that the principal communities and institutions can accept. The renewed tensions of 2025–26 show that the distance between those two objectives remains the central unresolved question.